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The Peril of Paroline: How the Supreme Court Made 
It More Difficult for Victims of Child Pornography 
“[E]xtremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And . . . 
moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.” 
—Barry Goldwater1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, Congress passed the Mandatory Restitution Provision 
as a way to help those who have suffered enormous losses as child 
pornography victims.2 “Andy”3 is one of those victims. FBI Special 
Agent Jeff Ross had received a file on a young boy who was being 
repeatedly sexually abused by an adult male. The National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) sent him the file after 
determining that the abuse occurred in Utah from hearing a radio ad 
for a Utah car dealer and “see[ing] a Salt Lake City telephone 
directory in the background” of a video.4 Agent Ross had a break in 
the case and was able to learn the name of the victim, the city where 
he lived, and the name of the abuser—Antonio Cardenas.5 
For three of the five years Cardenas volunteered as a “big 
brother” to Andy, he had sexually abused Andy and documented the 
abuse with video and photos. The first video of him showed acts of 
sexual abuse on a blanket decorated with the Nickelodeon cartoon, 
SpongeBob Squarepants. The series of videos became known as the 
“SpongeBob” series in the underground child-porn community and 
is among the most widely distributed child pornography on the 
 
 1.  Senator Barry Goldwater, Speech Accepting the Republican Presidential 
Nomination (Jul. 16, 1964), http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ 
barrygoldwater1964rnc.htm. 
 2.  18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2012). 
 3.  “Andy” is a pseudonym used to protect the victim’s identity. 
 4.  Brooke Adams, For FBI Agent, Luck and Dedication Cracked Child Porn Case, 
SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 24, 2012), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/ 
54341564-78/ross-cardenas-child-utah.html.csp. 
 5.  Id. 
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Internet.6 Cardenas repeatedly raped the child, acts that he deemed 
as “consensual sex” performed in the name of love. Cardenas 
believes that there is nothing criminal or inherently wrong with 
having sex with children. He thinks that laws should be changed to 
decriminalize this behavior.7 
At one point, Cardenas lost his job and decided to move back 
with his parents in Mexico. He wanted to profit as the “creator of 
SpongeBob” from his videos and contacted private child-porn 
traders “to get everything from anybody with nothing but my 
name.”8 He knew he “had a very unique, special, tradable, beautiful 
kid series with which to climb up the pornography ladder,” and 
would be able to “get access to things [he] always wanted to see but 
could never get hold of.”9 In a short time span, he “felt like [he] was 
god, [he] was at the top of the game.”10 
Antonio Cardenas was arrested January 10, 2010, and the story 
of Andy’s abuse came to light.11 At Cardenas’s sentencing, Andy’s 
mother brought in two large boxes containing hundreds of brown 
envelopes, each a victim-notification statement regarding a case 
where a defendant was charged with possessing “SpongeBob” 
images. His mother poignantly observed, “Every one of those 
envelopes represents perverts looking at pictures of my son.”12 At the 
time of sentencing, there were at least 500 defendants.13 Today, that 
number is rapidly approaching 1,000.14 
 
 6.  Brief for “Vicky” & “Andy” as Amici Curiae Supporting Amy Unknown at 3, 
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12.8561). 
 7.  Stephen Dark, Warped Desire: Inside the Mind of a Child Pornographer, SALT LAKE 
CITY WKLY. (Aug. 01, 2012), http://www.cityweekly.net/utah/warped-
desire/Content?oid=2284115&showFullText=true. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  This number is based on a count of the number of cases recorded with the Utah 
Crime Victims Legal Clinic as of December 2014.  The Utah Crime Victims Legal Clinic 
receives notices on a regular basis and the number is expected to continue to increase. 
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Andy’s losses encompass psychological counseling and future lost 
income. Andy also seeks restitution for expenses for a forensic 
psychological exam and follow-up report and an econometric 
calculation of his actual losses as a necessary precursor to his 
restitution requests, as well as legal fees.15 Andy’s case is precisely the 
situation Congress had in mind when it passed 18 U.S.C. § 2259, 
the Mandatory Restitution Provision, which applies to child 
pornography victims. 
In a report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Justice 
defined child pornography as “the possession, trade, advertising, 
and production of images that depict the sexual abuse of 
children.”16 It is worth noting that the term child pornography has 
fallen out of favor among experts in the field because the “use of 
that term contributes to a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
crime—one that focuses on the possession or trading of a picture 
and leaves the impression that what is depicted in the photograph is 
pornography. Child pornography is unrelated to adult 
pornography; it clearly involves the criminal depiction and 
memorializing of the sexual assault of children and the criminal 
sharing, collecting, and marketing of the images.”17 
There is a rising preference for calling these photographs 
indecent images of children, child exploitation materials, and child 
abuse images, which “is thought to more adequately capture the 
content of these images and the ways that they are used, and move 
 
 15.  Sample Restitution Request, Utah Crime Victims Legal Clinic (on file with author). 
 16.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION 
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (2010). 
 17.  Id.; see RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, INTERNET CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY: CAUSES, INVESTIGATION, AND PREVENTION 7–9 (Graeme R. Newman ed., 
2012) (“There is much debate in the literature and among advocacy groups and law 
enforcement agencies about the proper term for sexual material involving children. Some have 
objected to the term child pornography on the grounds that it trivializes the severity of the 
offense by linking the problem too closely with the legal production and consumption of adult 
pornography . . . .”); Paul G. Cassell et al., The Case for Full Restitution for Child Pornography 
Victims, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61, 68 (2013) (“[A]lthough the term ‘child pornography’ is 
widely used, it carries misleading cultural connotations. The term ‘pornography’ equates child 
pornography with erotic material appealing to the viewer’s normative sexual interest, and is 
neither the best nor the most accurate term to describe, for example, images and videos which 
graphically record children being raped.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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us away from uncritical comparisons with adult pornography.”18 
However, in this Comment, the term “child pornography” will be 
used “because it is the legal and accepted term for images of child 
sexual abuse,”19 it is what is used in legislation and by law 
enforcement, and it is easily identifiable by the general public. 
This Comment looks at the way the Mandatory Restitution 
Provision developed, how it has been interpreted, and how Congress 
has responded to the Court’s decision. Part II examines some of the 
motivations and public issues that informed congressional action on 
behalf of the victims of child pornography. Part III introduces the 
victims the government represented in the recent Supreme Court 
decision regarding the Mandatory Restitution Provision, Paroline v. 
United States.20 Part IV discusses the Paroline decision, including the 
framework for courts as embedded in the canons of construction 
used when interpreting statutes, the particular interpretive problems 
Paroline presents, how the Court interpreted the statute, and the 
effects and continuing problems that exist in the wake of Paroline. 
Part V concludes. 
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE GROWING CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY TREND 
In response to “a rising tide of violence . . . target[ing] American 
women both in the streets and in their own homes” with “increasing 
incidence of rape, sexual assault and domestic violence,”21 Congress 
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994, which 
serves all victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence regardless of 
age or gender.22 Acknowledging that sexual assault “carries with it 
long-term psychological wounds” along with “often serious physical 
 
 18.  Ethel Quayle & Roberta Sinclair, An Introduction to the Problem, in 
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING ONLINE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 4 (Ethel 
Quayle & Kurt M. Ribisl eds., 2012) (citations omitted). 
 19.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 8 (emphasis omitted). 
 20.  Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014). 
 21.  H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 25 (1993). 
 22.  Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001–703, 108 
Stat. 1796, 1902–55 (1994) (enacted as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994). 
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injuries” that would both need treatment,23 this act required courts 
to order defendants to pay “the full amount of the victim’s losses” as 
restitution24 to victims of child sexual abuse falling under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251 et seq., including not only the creation and distribution of 
child pornography, but also possession of child pornography.25 Child 
victims of sexual assault experience actual harm and long-term effects 
that require ongoing treatment. 
A. Mandatory Restitution 
Congress intended that child pornography victims receive full 
compensation from their offenders.26 Child pornography victims 
are entitled to restitution in the full amount of their eligible losses 
from defendants convicted of possessing or distributing their 
images.27 Full restitution 
includes any costs incurred by the victim for—(A) medical services 
relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; (B) physical 
and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; (C) necessary 
transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses; (D) 
lost income; (E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and 
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of 
the offense.28  
Ordering restitution is mandatory, seemingly imposing joint and 
several liability on each defendant.29 “A court may not decline to 
[order restitution] because of the economic circumstances of the 
defendant; or the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive 
compensation for his or her injuries from the proceeds of insurance 
 
 23.  H.R. REP. NO. 130-395, at 26 (1993). Victims are “8.7 times as likely as non-
victims to have attempted suicide and twice as likely to experience major depression.” Id. 
(quoting Victims of Rape: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and 
Families, 101st Cong. 37 (1990) (statement of Dean G. Kilpatrick, Ph.D.). 
 24.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012). 
 25.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (b)(4) (2012). 
 26.  See id. § 2259(b)(1). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. § 2259(b)(1), (3). 
 29.  Id. § 2259(b)(4)(A). 
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or any other source.”30 This provision supports “Congress’s well-
founded recognition that the possession and distribution of child 
pornography causes significant harm to the victims depicted in those 
images. The endless circulation of a victim’s child sex images subjects 
victims to continuous invasions of privacy that cause lasting 
psychological injury”31 that can be measured in economic losses.32 
This provision also supports the declaration in the Crime Victim’s 
Rights Act,33 which states that “[a] crime victim has . . .  [t]he right 
to full and timely restitution as provided in law.”34 
Congress enacted the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 
to amend its predecessor, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 
1982.35 In a committee report to the House of Representatives on 
the proposed Victim Restitution Act regarding restitution to victims 
of crime, the threefold purpose was delineated: 1) “to ensure that 
the loss to crime victims is recognized, and that they receive the 
restitution that they are due,” 2) “to ensure that the offender 
realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to 
the victim as well as to society,” and 3) “to replace an existing 
patchwork of different rules governing orders of restitution under 
various Federal criminal statutes with one consistent procedure.”36 
This Act reinforces the mandatory nature of restitution orders for 
the crimes covered in 18 U.S.C. § 2259, and was not intended to 
change the “scope of restitution authorized by the mandatory 
restitution provisions of the Violence Against Women Act . . . .”37 
 
 30.  Id. § 2259(b)(4)(B). 
 31.  Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 66. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (2012). This Act was signed into law on October 30, 
2004, greatly enhancing the victim’s role in criminal proceedings.  See Victims’ Rights, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 8, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/victims-rights-
services/victims-rights. 
 34.  18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (2012). 
 35.  18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012). 
 36.  S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1995); see Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 201–11, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227–41 (1996) (enacted as Title II, 
Subtitle A of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996). 
 37.  S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 19 (1995). 
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B. Victims of Child Pornography 
An understanding of the impact of being a victim of internet 
child pornography can aid in an understanding of the indivisible 
nature of the harm done by those who possess these images—the 
focus should be on the harm to the victim, not on what is in the 
images or even the offender’s perception of his own role in the 
victimization.38 To understand the motivation behind Congress’s 
actions in passing the Mandatory Restitution Act, it is helpful to look 
at the actual harm done to the child victims of sexual assault. 
Congress has relied on reports and evidence from various agencies 
depicting the trauma and continuing effects of sexual assault in the 
ongoing process of strengthening protection for children.39 Child 
pornography, which has become increasingly prevalent with growing 
ease of access to the internet, is a major concern.40 The Honorable 
John Adams decried the current state of affairs, proclaiming that 
“[g]iven the current statistics surrounding child pornography, we are 
living in a country that is losing its soul.”41 In an influential 1982 
decision, New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court found that child 
pornography and the intrinsically related sexual abuse of children 
harm the victims because “the materials produced are a permanent 
record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is 
exacerbated by their circulation.”42 
As horrible as the original abuse is for the victim, “its 
memorialization, distribution, and viewing are psychologically 
 
 38.  Marcella Mary Leonard, “I Did What I Was Directed to Do but He Didn’t Touch 
Me”: The Impact of Being a Victim of Internet Offending, 16 J.  SEXUAL AGGRESSION 249, 
249–50 (2010). 
 39.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 n.11 (1982) (quoting Sexual 
Exploitation of Children: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Judiciary Comm., 
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1977) (statement of Frank Osanka, Professor of Social Justice and 
Sociology) (“[We] have to be very careful . . . that we don’t take comfort in the existence of 
statutes that are on the books in the connection with the use of children in pornography.”). 
 40.  U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 16. 
 41.  Id. at 1 (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. 
Ohio 2010)). 
 42.  Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. 
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intertwined with and compound the impact of the abuse.”43 The 
American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children (APSAC) 
notes that “[i]t is not only that a child is sexually assaulted or abused 
as part of its production that makes child pornography so damaging, 
but also the fact that detailed and graphic images of the child’s 
sexual assault or abuse are made available to millions across the 
globe.”44 And “each person who views the images inflicts fresh 
damage to the victim. . . . The harm is multiplied by the very size of 
the global marketplace.”45 These harms include their images being 
used to increase the demand for child pornography and the victims 
knowing that their images are being used for the sexual gratification 
of others. 
Victims are first harmed by the sexual assault memorialized in 
heinous images, and then re-victimized every time these images are 
shared over the Internet with a worldwide audience.46 The 
anonymous nature of the Internet makes it difficult to identify and 
locate the offenders, who often meet up in online communities 
where trading images is “one component of a larger relationship that 
is premised on a shared sexual interest in children.”47 Having a 
“support group” in their network of online “friends” makes these 
perpetrators bolder, erodes the shame usually present with this kind 
of behavior, and desensitizes the viewers to the damage, both 
physical and psychological, experienced by the children, creating a 
self-reinforcing cycle that fuels an increasing demand for more 
images.48 “In the world of child pornography, this demand drives 
supply. The individual collector who methodically gathers one image 
after another has the effect of validating the production of the image, 
which leads only to more production.”49 
 
 43.  Amicus Brief of the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children 
Supporting Respondent at 6, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12-
8561) [hereinafter APSAC Brief]. 
 44.  Id. at 5. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 3. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
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The children who are sexually exploited on the Internet suffer a 
special kind of harm through their knowledge that the images of 
their abuse are being used for the sexual gratification of countless 
pedophiles at their expense. Academic researchers, medical 
professionals, and child pornography victims themselves report that 
knowing that it is impossible to remove or retrieve all copies of 
child pornography images “compounds the victimization.”50 The 
victims’ shame is deepened by the knowledge that their abuse was 
recorded in images readily available to others, and the children are 
re-victimized each time those images are used for sexual 
gratification.51 “[T]hese children struggle to find closure and may 
be more prone to feelings of helplessness and lack of control, given 
that the images cannot be retrieved and are available for others to 
see in perpetuity. They experience anxiety as a result of the 
perpetual fear of humiliation that they will be recognized from the 
images.”52 The victims of child pornography are denied their right 
to privacy and fundamental human dignity when the images of 
their abuse are posted to the Internet, never again to be fully 
retracted once they have started circulating and being viewed by 
others.53 “The possessor thus has real victims and inflicts actual 
harm upon them by his conduct.”54 
 
 50.  Id. at 9. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 853–
54 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 54.  Id. at 854. The mother of one victim describes the harm her daughter 
experienced:  
The pictures of my daughter were “made for trade”— her abuser adapted to serve 
his market—whatever his audience was looking to acquire, that’s what happened to 
her . . . Producer, distributor, and consumer—everyone who participates in this evil 
exchange helps create a market, casting a vote for the next abuse. Regardless of 
whether they directly abused children themselves, reveled in the images of suffering, 
or persuaded others to abuse children on their behalf (to provide images of the 
abuse) each participant has a responsibility for the effects . . . . I can find no words 
to express the fury I feel at those who participate in this evil, or my scorn for any 
attempt to minimize responsibility by feeble claims that the crime was “victimless.” 
My daughter is a real person. She was horribly victimized to provide this source of 
“entertainment.” She is exploited anew each and every time an image of her 
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Pornography is not only an end-product, but also a common 
element of grooming.55 In the process of grooming, the offender 
attempts to normalize sexual behavior in the “offender-child 
relationship by introducing increasingly intimate physical contact by 
the offender toward the victim, very gradually sexualizing the 
contact, and sometimes using child pornography to break down the 
child’s barriers.”56 As part of their methodology, child pornography 
is introduced to demonstrate desired behaviors with suggestive 
images and nudity.57 The offender is usually in a position of authority 
and trust over the immature and submissive child—a combination 
that makes it possible to subdue the child’s resistance through a 
gradual process.58 Then, actual sexual abuse ensues. The victims have 
little or no control over their situation and circumstances and have 
difficulty comprehending what is happening and why.59 Having likely 
been subjected to the grooming process themselves, victims suffer 
even more knowing that the images of their horrific experiences are 
being used by predators to condition more victims.60 
Child sex victims typically experience long-term psychological 
harm and need lifelong care.61 There is usually pressure from the 
offender to elicit cooperation and secrecy from his victim.62 The 
impact of sexual abuse encompasses post-traumatic stress syndrome 
(PTSD), trauma symptoms, presentations of depression, anxiety, self-
abusive behaviors, substance abuse, and low self-esteem, as well as 
sexual and relationship difficulties.63 After being abused, child victims 
“may feel grief, guilt and fear,” resulting in behavior that reflects an 
 
suffering is copied, traded, or sold. While the crime is clearly conscienceless, it is 
hardly “victimless.”  
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 10. 
 55.  APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 9. 
 56.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 21. 
 57.  Id. at 31. 
 58.  Id. at 21. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 3. 
 61.  Id. at 10. 
 62.  WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 17, at 15. 
 63.  Leonard, supra note 38, at 249–50. 
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“inability to trust, cognitive confusion, lack of mastery and control, 
repressed anger and hostility, blurred boundaries and role confusion, 
pseudo-maturity, and failure to complete development tasks, 
depression, and poor social skills.”64 
Victims also feel shame because of their self-perceived complicity, 
a perception that is often encouraged by their offender, and a 
conflicting sense of loyalty to the offender.65 Later in life, those initial 
feelings of “shame and anxiety” do not fade, rather they intensify to 
“deep despair, worthlessness, and hopelessness.”66 Their experiences 
often yield a “distorted model of sexuality,” and victims frequently 
have difficulty “establishing and maintaining healthy emotional and 
sexual relationships.”67 
Studies have recognized that child sex victims are at higher risk 
for health problems such as depression, alcoholism, illicit drug use, 
unintended pregnancies, and sexually transmitted diseases.68 One 
study found a “direct neural mechanism, via alteration of the brain’s 
fear circuitry . . . [where] maltreatment [led] to anxiety and 
depressive symptoms by late adolescence.”69 Female victims in 
particular are at “an increased risk of further sexual victimization 
later in life—often in apparently unrelated circumstances . . . . 
[W]omen who had experienced sexual abuse as a child were twice as 
likely as previously non-victimized women to be raped.”70 
Child pornography victims experience even greater harm. After 
the initial abuse, every time the pornographic images are viewed by 
others, the children depicted are victimized again. One expert noted 
that “[t]he victim’s knowledge of publication of the visual material 
 
 64.  APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 12 (citation omitted). 
 65.  WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 17, at 15. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 10. 
 69.  Id. at 11 (quoting Ryan J. Herringa et al., Childhood Maltreatment Is Associated 
with Altered Fear Circuitry and Increased Internalizing Symptoms by Late Adolescence, PNAS 
EARLY ED. (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2013/10/30/ 
1310766110.full.pdf+html). 
 70.  WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 17, at 73. 
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increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.”71 
The exponential growth of the circulation of the pictures on the 
Internet causes these feelings to be continual, because at any given 
time, the images are in circulation and every stranger a victim meets 
can be an offender. This type of exposure causes a never-ending 
barrage of feelings of shame, humiliation, and powerlessness 
requiring lifelong care.72 Child pornography victims experience 
exacerbated negative effects.73 
“Each time the image is viewed is experienced as a fresh assault 
by the victim . . . . [V]ictims feel ‘impotent because they will have 
had no control over the disclosure process—they have not been able 
to choose when to disclose, what to disclose, how to disclose, and to 
whom they want to disclose.’”74 Because victims do not know who 
these viewers may be and how many there are, they develop a 
“general feeling of unsafeness, feeling sexualized, feeling victimized 
because they cannot identify their perpetrators” because they do not 
know who the perpetrators are. They “could be people whom they 
meet every day in shops, offices, leisure centres, church, school and 
parks, as well as people whom they know.”75 Victims are profoundly 
affected by  
the knowledge of what the unknown perpetrators are doing 
sexually to their picture every time one of the perpetrators views 
that picture . . . [and] the realization of the quantity of people who 
are looking, not past-tense looked but still present-tense looking, at 
their pictures . . . gaining and performing sexual gratification to 
their pictures at any time of the day.76  
 
 71.  Rogers, supra note 53, at 854 (quoting T. Christopher Donnelly, Protection of 
Children from Use in Pornography: Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 295, 301 (1979)). 
 72.  Id. at 853–54 (footnotes omitted). 
 73.  APSAC Brief, supra note 4343, at 12. 
 74.  Id. at 13. 
 75.  Leonard, supra note 38, at 252. 
 76.  Id. at 253. In Amy’s Victim Impact Statement, she describes how she is affected by 
this knowledge:  
Every day of my li[f]e I live in constant fear that someone will see my pictures and 
recognize me and that I will be humiliated all over again. It hurts to know someone 
is looking at them—at me—when I was just a little girl being abused for the camera. 
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The perpetrators of these ongoing fresh assaults based on possession 
of the images are not separable to the victims from the creators or 
the distributors. 
III. VICTIMS AMY77 AND VICKY78 AND THEIR QUEST FOR 
RESTITUTION 
The primary purpose of the Mandatory Restitution Act 
seems clear: to provide mandatory restitution in full to the 
victim for his or her losses.79 However, this has not been the case 
as illustrated by the situations of Amy and Vicky, both victims of 
Internet child pornography. 
Amy and her uncle shared a “special secret.”80 That “secret” 
involved her uncle telling her that he loved her while raping her, 
forcing her to endure masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, and 
digital and anal penetration.81 But Amy’s uncle did not keep their 
“special secret.” Amy is the victim depicted in what has been 
dubbed the “Misty” series.82 Amy’s uncle forced her to pose for 
photographs in response to specific requests from Internet users,83 
and forced her to communicate with “followers.”84 Some of the 
assaults on her were perpetrated in order to provide child 
 
I did not choose to be there, but now I am there forever in pictures that people are 
using to do sick things.  
Jonathan R. Hornok, Note, A Right to Contribution and Federal Restitution Orders, 2013 
UTAH L. REV. 661, 663 n.17 (2013) (quoting Government’s Memorandum of Law Regarding 
the Victims’ Losses at 8, United States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 
09-243), 2010 WL 6845823). 
 77.  “Amy” is a pseudonym used to protect the victim’s identity. 
 78.  “Vicky” is a pseudonym used to protect the victim’s identity. 
 79.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (1996). 
 80.  Hornok, supra note 76, at 663. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children on Issues of 
Restitution for Victims of Child Pornography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 at 6, United States v. 
Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 6:08-CR-61) [hereinafter NCMEC Brief]. 
 83.  Hornok, supra note 76, at 663. 
 84.  Id. 
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pornography for a child molester in the Seattle area, making her 
also a victim of child sexual exploitation.85 
At the age of nine, Amy underwent psychological counseling to 
come to terms with the devastating trauma she had endured at the 
hands of her uncle.86 Eventually, Amy got to a point where her 
therapist reported that she was “back to normal.”87 Then, at the age 
of seventeen, Amy learned that images of her abuse were in the 
hands of countless individuals and were a popular trade item among 
pedophiles.88 “Amy’s use of a pseudonym reflects a painful irony: she 
seeks anonymity, but hers is among the most widely trafficked ‘series’ 
of child pornography in the world.”89 
Vicky was also sexually abused at a young age.90 Her abuser took 
requests from pedophiles and then forced Vicky to perform those 
requests, including rape, anal penetration, and bondage.91 Vicky also 
learned of the widespread distribution of the images of her abuse 
many years later.92 This knowledge has had a profound, negative 
impact on her psychological well-being.93 
Amy has received notice of more than 1,500 defendants who 
were found in possession of her images.94 Prior to the recent 
 
 85.  Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 70; see also NCMEC Brief, supra note 82. 
 86.  Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 70. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 90.  Hornok, supra note 76, at 664. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id.  
When I learn . . . about [a] defendant having downloaded the pictures of me, it adds 
to my paranoia, it makes me feel again like I was being abused by another man who 
had been leering at pictures of my naked body being tortured, it gives me chills to 
think about. I live in fear that any of them, may try to find me and contact me and 
do something to me. I have been contacted by some of them and some have said 
terrible things to me. The fact that each one is out there and has seen me and 
watched me being raped makes me sicker, makes me feel less safe, makes me feel 
more ashamed and humiliated. 
Id. (quoting Government’s Memorandum of Law Regarding the Victims’ Losses at 8, United 
States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 09-243), 2010 WL 6845823). 
 94.  Hornok, supra note 76, at 666. 
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Supreme Court decision in Paroline, her attorney routinely 
requested restitution for the full amount of her losses from each 
defendant.95 The full amount of her losses is $3,367,854 and 
includes future treatment and lost future income.96 She has 
acquired more than $20,000 in expenses for expert witness fees and 
attorney’s fees.97 Vicky’s losses are calculated at $497,819.86 and 
her attorney also regularly requested restitution in the full amount 
from each defendant.98 
Because of the nature of the Internet and the ease of access to 
the images of Amy and Vicky, defendants were brought to trial, 
convicted, and sentenced in district courts across the country. Prior 
to the Paroline decision, some courts awarded nothing, some courts 
ordered full restitution, and some courts entered a restitution 
amount somewhere in between.99 The primary issue in determining 
the restitution award is whether proximate cause is a necessary 
condition to the losses listed in subsections (A)-(E) of the 
Mandatory Restitution Act or only to “any other losses” where the 
proximate-result requirement is attached.100 Federal appellate courts 
were split in the results. The Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined in In re Unknown, that the proximate-result requirement 
only applies to the last catchall provision.101 Nearly all other circuit 
courts ruled that the proximate-result requirement applied to all 
losses, some even awarding no restitution after determining that 
there was not a sufficient causal connection between the victim’s 
losses and the defendant’s actions.102 A separate issue discussed in 
these cases was how to split the required full restitution amount 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 97.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Lorelei Laird, Pricing Amy: Should Those Who Download Child Pornography Pay the 
Victims?, 98 A.B.A. J. 48, 51 (2012). 
 100.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3) (1996). 
 101.  Laird, supra note 99, at 51–52; see In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 774 (5th Cir. 
2012) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014). 
 102.  Laird, supra note 99, at 52. 
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among defendants, both known and unknown, current and future, 
in unpredictable numbers.103 
On February 3, 2009, one defendant, Doyle Randall Paroline, 
pled guilty to possessing two images of Amy.104 Amy sought 
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259, and the Fifth District Court 
declined to award restitution.105 The victim then sought a writ of 
mandamus, which was eventually granted en banc in consolidated 
appeals from the United States District Courts for the Eastern 
District of Texas and the Eastern District of Louisiana, incorporating 
Michael Wright as a defendant.106 The Fifth District Court held that 
each defendant who possessed the victim’s images should be liable 
for the entire amount of the losses of that victim.107 Ultimately, the 
case made its way to the Supreme Court, where it was argued on 
January 22, 2014 and decided on April 23, 2014.108 
Several parties with an interest in the outcome filed amicus curiae 
briefs. One of the most relevant of these briefs was submitted by a 
bipartisan group of United States senators in support of Amy 
Unknown. Each of the amici served in the 103rd Congress that 
passed the provision at issue in the Paroline case and “are deeply 
interested in ensuring that child-pornography victims like Amy 
receive the restitution to which they are entitled . . . [and] have a 
fundamental and institutional interest in seeing Congress’s 
enactments enforced as they are written.”109 The bipartisan brief 
 
 103.  Id. For example, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has 
obtained more than 35,000 “extremely graphic” images of Amy’s abuse in over 3200 cases. In 
re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 752. 
 104. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2014); United States v. Paroline, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7422 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2009). 
 105. United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 782 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 134 S. 
Ct. 1710 (2014). 
 106. In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d. 
 107. Id. at 752. 
 108. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 
 109. Brief for United States Senators Orrin G. Hatch, Dianne Feinstein, Charles E. 
Grassley, Edward J. Markey, John McCain, Patty Murray, and Charles E. Schumer as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (No. 12-
8561) [hereinafter Brief for United States Senators]. 
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functions as a synopsis of the intentions of Congress in passing the 
provisions and an aid to the courts in interpreting the statutes. 
The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children 
(APSAC) also submitted an amicus curiae to the Supreme Court in 
support of Amy Unknown. The APSAC is the leading national 
organization that supports the professionals who treat children and 
their families who have been affected by child sex abuse and child 
pornography.110 It submitted the brief “to assist the Court in 
understanding the most recent science documenting the nature and 
harm done to victims by the market in child pornography.”111 
Amicus briefs in support of Amy Unknown were also filed by 
multiple parties with interest in the case.112 
Despite the overwhelming support demonstrated on behalf of 
the respondents in the amicus briefs, the Supreme Court vacated the 
decision and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit, concluding 
that the proximate-cause requirement applied to the losses in all 
subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 2259, and that restitution could only be 
ordered to the extent that the defendant’s offense proximately 
caused the victim’s losses.113 District courts should, therefore, assess 
in the best way it could from the evidence, the weight of the 
defendant’s conduct in comparison with the broader process that 
produced the losses.114 Amy’s case was remanded to the district court 
for a new calculation of restitution. 
 
 110. APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 1. 
 111. Id. at 2. 
 112. The briefs were filed by the National Crime Victim Bar Association, et al., the 
Women’s and Children’s Advocacy Project, and Justice for Children, Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving, the National District Attorneys Association, the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children, victims in other related proceedings, “Vicky” and “Andy,” ECPAT 
International, the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project et al., the 
Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings and Sexual Violence Against 
Children, the National Association to Protect Children, the State of Washington, et al., and 
the National Crime Victim Law Institute et al. Paroline v. United States, Proceedings and 
Orders, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/paroline-v-united-
states/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). 
 113. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1720–22. 
 114. Id. at 1727–29. 
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IV. THE PAROLINE DECISION: PROBLEMS PRESENTED AND THE 
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION 
The majority opinion in Paroline primarily rested on the 
interpretation of two statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2259 and 18 U.S.C. § 
3771. The tools that courts should use in interpreting statutes are 
commonly debated and the subject of many books and articles. The 
debate over judicial statutory interpretation is often described in 
opposing models: the faithful-agent model (encompassing textualism 
and intentionalism)115 and a best-answer approach.116 The majority 
decision in Paroline, however, is not justified by either the faithful-
agent model or a best-answer approach under the canons of 
construction, nor according to purposes of Congress as evidenced in 
legislative history. 
 
 115. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION 201 (2010). As the name suggests, “the assumption that judges must act as 
Congress’s faithful agent” is the basic premise of this philosophy. Id. A proponent of the 
faithful-agent model might claim that courts should be guarded in decisions and that 
“judges are no more competent than others to engage large issues of political theory . . . . 
[J]udges of divergent political persuasions can discern the original meaning of texts without 
making political judgments of their own . . . . [A] judge . . . need not undertake political 
and moral analysis in individual cases.” KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 10–11 (1999); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and 
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001). To do this, courts should look to 
the plain meaning of the original text and the canons of statutory construction (textualism), 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 231–
37 (2d ed. 2006), and rely on legislative intent by looking to the specific intent of 
Congress, imaginative reconstruction, and the general intent or purpose Congress had when 
enacting the statute (intentionalism). Id. at 221–30. 
 116. MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 115, at 201−02. In the best-answer 
approach, judges act more like Congress’s junior partners than as agents of Congress. Id. 
Judges have more participation in shaping legislation through interpretation and though the 
interpretation proceeds from a statute, their decisions need not be strictly bound by 
congressional instruction. Id. Guido Calabresi proposed “a new relationship between courts 
and statutes, a relationship that would enable us to retain the legislative initiative in 
lawmaking . . . while restoring to courts their common law function of seeing to it that the law 
is kept up to date.” GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 7 
(1982). Ronald Dworkin posited that a judge should “see his own role as fundamentally the 
creative one of a partner continuing to develop, in what he believes is the best way, the 
statutory scheme Congress began.” RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313 (1986). 
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A. Proximate-Cause Requirement 
In Paroline, the Supreme Court held that a victim must prove 
that costs for which the victim seeks restitution stem from the 
offense in question. The cause must be proximate, not simply a 
factual link (i.e., there must be a sufficient connection between the 
offense and the restitution costs requested).117 In coming to this 
holding, the Supreme Court did not adhere to the customary 
standards expected for statutory interpretation. Because Congress 
would anticipate that the courts would use these conventional 
methods when interpreting the statute, the Supreme Court acted in 
a way that rejected Congress’s intent and purpose in passing the 
Mandatory Restitution Act. Furthermore, the Court did so with full 
knowledge of what Congress had intended because of the bi-partisan 
amicus brief filed by those who spearheaded the statute, which 
explained the interpretive methods Congress was relying on when it 
wrote and enacted the statute.118 The interpretive methods Congress 
anticipated courts using include: a) the plain meaning of the text; b) 
the rule of the last antecedent; c) the presumption against 
surplusage; and d) use of legislative history. “Where the statute’s 
plain text, its legislative history, and multiple canons of statutory 
interpretation all speak with one voice, the Court’s job is not a 
difficult one.”119 
1. Canons of construction 
The judiciary uses canons of construction as interpretive 
guidelines for determining the meaning of statutes that have 
ambiguity. The cardinal canon of construction that should be used 
before all others in interpreting a statute is the plain meaning of the 
text. “[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what 
it means and means in a statute what it says there.”120 With regard to 
the Mandatory Restitution Act, the senators argued in their brief, 
 
 117. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1720–22. 
 118. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
 119. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 3. 
 120. Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (citations omitted). 
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“[t]he statute’s meaning is plain, and it should be enforced as it was 
written.”121 The statute’s text clearly requires that the “proximate 
result” limitation only applies to subsection (F).122 
Under the Mandatory Restitution Act, “qualifying as a 
‘victim’ . . . is the only causal nexus required to recover for the five 
categories of specific costs listed in subsections (A)–(E).” The 
catchall category in the sixth subsection includes “an undefined and 
potentially unpredictable set of costs. For costs falling into that less 
predictable category only, Congress included an additional 
‘proximate result’ constraint.”123 Subsections (A)–(E) do not require 
proximate cause, only that the individual meet the requirements of a 
“victim” according to the definition in the statute. “That is the 
statue Congress wrote, and this Court need look no further than its 
plain language . . . .”124 
The distinction between the “proximate result” constraint in 
subsection (F) and the lack thereof in subsections (A)–(E) “reflects 
Congress’s sound policy judgment to allow victims to recover certain 
identifiable and predictable losses with a threshold showing of basic 
causation (i.e., ‘victim’ status), and to likewise prevent victims from 
recovering ‘any other’ potentially more attenuated losses unless they 
can satisfy a proximate cause requirement.”125 
The Supreme Court, however, took a different reading of “the 
threshold question” of “whether § 2259 limits restitution to those 
losses proximately caused by the defendant’s offense conduct.”126 
The Court ignored the plain language of the congressional statutory 
mandate to award the victim full restitution for the costs in 
subsections (A)–(E), instead turning to a common-law 
understanding of proximate cause. Citing the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, the majority declared that “[t]he concept of proximate 
causation is applicable in both criminal and tort law, and . . . is often 
 
 121. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 3. 
 122. Id. at 4. 
 123. Id. at 2–3. 
 124. Id. at 5. 
 125. Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 81–82. 
 126. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2014). 
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explicated in terms of foreseeability or the scope of the risk created 
by the predicate conduct.”127 Further, the majority stated, “A 
requirement of proximate cause thus serves, inter alia, to preclude 
liability in situations where the causal link between conduct and 
result is so attenuated that the consequence is more aptly described 
as mere fortuity.”128 
Congress, basing its decision on carefully weighed research and 
evidence, determined that proximate cause was already sufficiently 
established by possessors of child pornography—there is no 
difference to the victim between those who possess and those who 
cause the images to be produced and distributed.129 “[F]rom the 
perspective of the victim, . . . there is no meaningful difference 
between the creator, the viewers, or the distributors of pornographic 
images. They are all participants in a marketplace of child 
pornography [who] . . . inflict pain and suffering on the victims.”130 
As such, all the participants both known and unknown, current 
offenders and future offenders, are players in a perpetual, indivisible 
harm. Therefore, the losses delineated in subsections (A)–(E) did not 
require that proximate cause be proven for each individual 
defendant. The Court dismissed the congressional findings based on 
academic experts and research, and instead determined that the 
defendant had only to pay for the losses caused by “the conduct of 
the particular defendant from whom restitution is sought,” ignoring 
the complex causality inherent in the defendant’s actions that 
Congress had considered.131 The majority concluded that “Paroline’s 
possession of two images of the victim was surely not sufficient to 
cause her entire losses from the ongoing trade in her images”132 
despite Congress’s considerations. Thus, the Court second-guessed 
Congress’s ability to determine the allocation of the harms to the 
victims among plaintiffs and rejected the Act’s plain meaning in favor 
 
 127. Id. (citation omitted). 
 128. Id. (citation omitted). 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 71–76. 
 130. APSAC Brief, supra note 43, at 2. 
 131. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1720. 
 132. Id. at 1723. 
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of an interpretation that reflected its own understanding of the 
harms that victims suffer. The Court reasoned that, “[g]iven 
proximate cause’s traditional role in causation analysis,” the Court 
could “[find] a proximate-cause requirement built into a statute that 
did not expressly impose one”133 even where Congress deliberately 
omitted it. In so doing, the majority effectively overrode the statute 
as it was written in the legislative process and rewrote it through the 
judicial process. 
The Court came to this decision despite having the explicit 
intent of Congress to not impose a proximate-cause requirement 
verified by multiple congressional actors who had played an active 
role in getting § 2259 passed.134 The majority sought to justify this 
decision by using the “proximate result” language that appears in the 
statue’s text.135 However, several canons of statutory interpretation 
support the opposite interpretation that the proximate-result 
requirement only applies to subsection (F).136 
Another canon of construction is the rule of the last 
antecedent. This canon states that “a limiting clause or 
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun 
or phrase that it immediately follows.”137 This canon, Justices 
Scalia and Garner noted, is “the legal expression of a 
commonsense principle of grammar.”138 While this rule can be 
overcome by other “textual indication[s] of contrary 
meaning,”139 there must be something “to justify tossing aside 
the rules of grammar and statutory interpretation.”140 
 
 133. Id. at 1720 (citations omitted). 
 134. See supra text accompanying note 109. 
 135. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1719–20. 
 136. Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 11. 
 137. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). 
 138. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 144 (2012). “It is clearly desirable that an anaphoric (backward-looking) 
or cataphoric (forward-looking) pronoun should be placed as near as the construction 
allows to the noun or noun phrase to which it refers, and in such a manner that there is no 
risk of ambiguity.” Id. (quoting FOWLER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE (R.H Burchfield ed., 
3d ed. 1996)). 
 139.  See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1344 (2013) (confirming that 
the rule of the last antecedent should be applied unless textually indicated otherwise); cf. Porto 
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This canon has been relied on by the Supreme Court141 and 
circuit courts when interpreting statutes142 and by Congress when 
authoring statutes. Professor Cassell et al. shows how the Supreme 
Court’s use of the rule of the last antecedent has been applied in two 
cases, Barnhart v. Thomas143 and Porto Rico Railway, Light & 
Power Co. v. Mor.144 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Barnhart contributes a 
precedent for how the rule of the last antecedent should apply to the 
Mandatory Restitution Act.145 In Barnhart, the Court acknowledged 
that, “although the rule of the last antecedent ‘is not absolute,’ the 
relative clause . . . modified only the noun phrase that it immediately 
follows, . . . but not the preceding noun-phrase . . . . [I]t is wrong to 
read qualifying language . . . as applying broadly throughout [the 
statute] generally. Doing so ‘stretches the modifier too far.’”146 In 
general, the last antecedent modifies only the phrase that 
immediately precedes it. 
In Porto Rico Railway, the Court discussed the use of the series-
qualifier canon as applied to series elements in “a long sentence, 
unbroken by numbers, letters, or bullets, with two complex noun 
phrases sandwiching the conjunction.”147 The Court in Porto Rico 
 
Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 346–49 (1920) (finding that there 
were “special reasons” to apply the limiting language to both preceding phrases where the 
provision in question was a lengthy sentence, not divided into subsections and separated only 
by commas, and the interpretation was necessary “to effectuate the general purpose of 
Congress” and avoid “assuredly unintended discrimination”). 
 140.  Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 12. 
 141.  Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 82–86. 
 142.  See, e.g., Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 P.3d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(remarking that the circuit courts have “long followed this interpretive principle”). 
 143.  540 U.S. 20 (2003). 
 144.  253 U.S. 345 (1920). 
 145.  Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 83–84. 
 146.  Id. (quoting Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26, and Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 
543 U.S. 335, 342 (2005)). 
 147. In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 763 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. 
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014); see also Porto Rico Railway, 253 U.S. at 
346 (quoting Jones Act of March 2, 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 965). The statutory 
provision analyzed in Porto Rico Railway states: “Said district court shall have jurisdiction of all 
controversies where all of the parties on either side of the controversy are citizens or subjects of 
a foreign State or States, or citizens of a State, Territory, or District of the United States not 
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Railway reasons that the clause ″not domiciled in Porto Rico” 
should be read so as to apply to all the series elements in the phrase 
“citizens or subjects of a foreign State or States, or citizens of a State, 
Territory, or Districts of the United States” as a “natural 
construction of the language.”148 This was especially appropriate 
given the intent of Congress in passing the statute. If there was some 
doubt as to the application of the clause to every series element, the 
Court “should so construe the provision as to effectuate the general 
purpose of Congress.”149 
The structure of § 2259 clearly shows that each subsection is 
designed to function as a fully independent element because the 
elements are lettered and separated by semicolons, and the limiting 
language in one subsection does not apply to the others.150 The 
“proximate result” requirement should, therefore, only apply to the 
subsection in which it appears (the loosely defined “other losses”), 
and not the five preceding antecedents (such as the medical 
expenses, lost income, and attorney’s fees). This interpretation is also 
justified by the textual indications of meaning because it supports the 
statutory mandate that victims obtain full restitution.151 
The Fifth Circuit persuasively distinguishes the provision in the 
Mandatory Restitution Act from the provision in Porto Rico 
Railway.152 In contrast to Porto Rico Railway, in § 2259, the 
introductory phrase “‘full amount of the victim’s losses’ includes any 
costs incurred by the victim for—” is formed with a noun and verb 
that feeds into a list of six eligible losses.153 All of these enumerated 
items function as independent objects, each of which completes the 
phrase. Only the last of these enumerated items has the limiting 
“proximate result” requirement. Furthermore, an em-dash sets the 
 
domiciled in Porto Rico . . . .” Id.; In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 762–63 (5th Cir. 
2012) (en banc), rev’d sub nom; Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (discussing 
the canon of the rule of the last antecedent). 
 148.  Porto Rico Railway, 253 U.S. at 348. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Brief for the United States Senators, supra note 109, at 12. 
 151.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012). 
 152.  In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 762–63. 
      153.    18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012). 
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list apart from the introductory phrase and semi-colons separate each 
of the elements, providing 
a divided grammatical structure that does not resemble the statute in 
Porto Rico Railway, with its flowing sentence that lacks any distinct 
separations . . . . The structural and grammatical differences between 
§ 2259 and the statute in Porto Rico Railway forcefully counsel 
against applying Porto Rico Railway to the current statute to reach 
the Paroline district court’s reading.154  
Scalia and Garner validate the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, 
clarifying that “semicolons insulate words from grammatical 
implications that would otherwise be created by the words that 
precede or follow them.”155 In other words, what happens in a 
subpart ending in a semicolon, stays in that subpart ending.156 To 
apply the “proximate cause” constraint to the medical services 
costs in § 2259, the reader must go backwards through four 
separate semicolons.157 
Furthermore, should the reader find any ambiguity in the 
statute, the contextual considerations in the statute reveal the 
congressional purpose that should be used when interpreting the 
statute. The Fifth Circuit noted that imposing the “proximate cause” 
constraint on the last “catchall” miscellaneous other loss provision 
only and not to the earlier provisions listing expenses that are more 
clearly demarcated and straightforwardly determined “makes sense” 
in light of Congress’s purpose.158 “[B]y construction, Congress knew 
the kinds of expense necessary for restitution under subsections A 
through E.” And, by definition, Congress “could not anticipate what 
victims would propose under the open-ended subsection F” (“any 
other losses suffered by the victim”).159 
 
 154.  In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 763. 
 155.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 138, at 162. 
 156.  Id. at 157–58. 
 157.  Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 86. 
 158.  In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d at 198, rev’d sub nom. Paroline v. United States, 
134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014). 
 159.  Id. 
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The majority in Paroline rejects the rule of the last antecedent, 
incorrectly analogizing to Porto Rico Railway instead of 
distinguishing it based on syntax and structure,160 declaring instead 
that “[catchall] clauses are to be read as bringing within a statute 
categories similar in type to those specifically enumerated.”161 
Despite Congress’s clearly stated intent to the contrary,162 the 
majority found that the “other losses suffered . . . as a proximate 
result of the offense”163 would be “most naturally understood as a 
summary of the type of losses covered.”164 This finding is justified by 
“common sense,” and was declared to be in accordance with the 
Court’s previously erroneous understanding of proximate cause as it 
pertains to this type of crime and these victims. The Court ignores 
Congress’s judgment and instead substitutes its own view of “the 
causal link between conduct and result,” finding that it is too 
“attenuated” and “more akin to mere fortuity.”165 
The Court then turns to an absurd illustration first posited in 
United States v. Monzell166 to show the need for a more strict 
application of the proximate-cause requirement. The majority 
proposes that if a victim on the way to therapy needed as a result of 
an offense were to get in a car accident, requiring the defendant to 
pay for the expenses associated with the car accident “would be 
strange indeed.”167 The court in Monzel argues that without a 
proximate-cause standard, a cause-in-fact standard is all that would 
apply, and the superseding event would not limit the liability of the 
defendant for medical expenses occurring as a result of the car 
accident.168 However, this is an incorrect interpretation of the types 
of expenses listed in subsections (A)–(E). Under a strict reading, the 
medical expenses relating to the car accident would not fall under 
 
 160.  See supra text accompanying notes 152–157. 
 161.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721 (citation omitted). 
 162.  See supra text accompanying notes 117–118. 
 163.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(F) (2012). 
 164.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721. 
 165.  Id. at 1719, 1721. 
 166.  United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 537 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 167.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721. 
 168.  Monzel, 641 F.3d at 537 n.8. 
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(A) as “medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or 
psychological care.” This expense would not “relate to” the medical 
care for the abuse. So, even though the accident may be directly 
caused by pursuing the care in subsection (A), thus meeting a “but-
for” causation standard, the care for the car accident injuries would 
not be one of the enumerated expenses and must, therefore, only be 
covered under subsection (F). This type of expense would already be 
subject to the “proximate result” limitation that adheres to 
subsection (F). There is no need to extend that limitation to the 
other subsections in an attempt to limit expenses to those that can be 
attributed to the defendant. Contrary to the Court’s interpretation, 
this example illustrates Congress’s reasoning for the catchall category 
in subsection (F)—a limitation that prevents these types of expenses 
from growing out of control. 
The presumption against surplusage canon provides that the 
court has a duty “to give effect, if possible to every clause and word 
of a statute.”169 To hold that the limiting language in subsection (F) 
of § 2259 applies to other subsections would create surplusage. As a 
rule, “Congress’s words should not be reduced to redundancy where 
a reading that gives them logical effect is readily available.”170 In 
interpreting the statute, if the proximate-result requirement extends 
to subsections (A)–(E), the specification of what losses qualify under 
mandatory restitution would be redundant—they would all be 
included under subsection (F),171 which states that “the victim’s 
losses includes any costs incurred by the victim for . . . any . . . losses 
suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.”172  
The Court finds the argument that the first five subsections 
“would be superfluous if all were governed by a proximate-cause 
requirement . . . unpersuasive.”173 The Court, again in direct contrast 
to the intent of Congress as stated in the amicus curiae brief,174 finds 
 
 169.  Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 
348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170.  Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 13. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(F) (2012). 
 173.    Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721. 
 174.  See supra text accompanying notes 118–119. 
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an alternate explanation that subsections (A)–(E) were meant to 
“provide guidance . . . as to the specific types of losses Congress 
thought would often be the proximate result.”175 This interpretation 
might be sustainable if the amicus curiae brief in the hands of the 
Court had not directly contradicted it, and if Congress had made any 
indication in the statute that this was the case. Congress could have 
put subsection (F) first, and listed (A)–(E) as examples of expenses as 
a “proximate result” of the offense or used the phrase “such as” in 
listing subsections (A)–(E). But this is not what Congress wrote, and 
it is a stretched interpretation that ignores both the plain meaning of 
the statute and the congressional intent. 
2. Legislative history 
Another widely held tenet of statutory interpretation is that if 
there is any ambiguity in a statute’s text, courts should consider a 
statute’s text “in light of the objectives Congress sought to 
achieve.”176 In the Mandatory Restitution Act, “the drafting 
history . . . makes clear that Congress really did mean what it 
said.”177 The Act was meant “to [p]rovide [g]enerous [r]estitution to 
[v]ictims.”178 Mandatory restitution for sex-crime victims was 
intended to be “a key mechanism for achieving the Act’s goals”179 of 
being “the cornerstone of the movement to make the United States 
a safer place for women”180 by “provid[ing] ‘powerful protection and 
assistance’ to the ‘[w]omen and children who are the innocent 
victims of domestic violence.’”181 
Another indication of congressional intent is found by the 
changes Congress made to the bill before it was ratified. “Where 
Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but 
 
 175.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721. 
 176.  Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 469 (1968). 
 177.  Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 3. 
 178.  Id. at 5. 
 179.  Id. at 6. 
 180.  Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S.15 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 185 (1991). 
 181.  Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 6 (quoting 139 CONG. REC. 
S1281 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller)). 
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deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation 
was not intended.”182 The original draft of the VAWA restitution 
provisions “contain[ed] two express ‘proximate result’ 
limitations.”183 In the enacted version, one of the “limitation[s] was 
deleted from the Act[] . . . prior to its passage . . . confirm[ing] that 
Congress acted intentionally when it included proximate-cause 
requirements for some kinds of costs and omitted them for 
others.”184 “It beggars belief that Congress’s decision to delete the 
‘proximate result’ language in the lost-income subsection was a sub 
silentio decision to incorporate proximate-cause principles into all of 
the subsections.”185 
An additional indication of Congress’s intent can be found in the 
deletion of the word “direct” from the definition of “victim.” In the 
original draft, a “victim” was defined as “any person who has 
suffered direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of a 
commission of a crime under this chapter.”186 “[W]hen the statute 
was enacted, all [provisions requiring mandatory restitution] defined 
‘victim’ . . . as ‘the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a 
crime under this chapter,’”187 thus eliminating the requirement for 
“direct” harm. 
Compare this mandatory-restitution provision in the Violence 
Against Women Act, written as a part of the larger Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act, with the mandatory-restitution 
provision in another part of that larger Act, the Senior Citizens 
Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994.188 The Senior Citizens 
Against Marketing Scams Act defines the term “victim” as “a person 
directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an 
offense for which restitution may be ordered.”189 Furthermore, the 
 
 182.  Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983). 
 183.  Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 3. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 9. 
 186.  Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 101-545, at 5, 17 (1990)) (emphasis removed). 
 187.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2248(c), 2259(c), 2264(c) (2012)). 
 188.  Id. at 10 (citing Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-332, 108 Stat. 2082 (1994)). 
 189.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2327(c) (2012)). 
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Act also “defines the ‘full amount of the victim’s losses’ as ‘all losses 
suffered by the victim as a proximate cause of the offense.’”190 The 
purposeful inclusion of a proximate-cause requirement in this Act 
“demonstrates that Congress knew how to impose a general 
proximate-cause requirement when it wished to,”191 and chose not to 
make the victims defined in § 2259 restricted by the same 
proximate-cause requirement in all recoverable costs. Instead, the 
Act “carefully explain[s] that some costs are recoverable in all 
circumstances while others are recoverable only with a showing of 
proximate cause.”192 The Court’s interpretation does not reflect the 
carefully constructed statute in light of its drafting history. 
B. Restitution 
The Court in Paroline determined that restitution can be 
ordered according to “the defendant’s relative role in the [larger] 
process” of the harms to the victim and that defendants cannot be 
held jointly and severally liable for the victim’s losses.193 However, 
this does not comport with the legislative intent of Congress, who 
intended that victims be fully compensated for their losses.194 
When Congress enacted the first victim restitution provision as 
part of the Victim and Witness Protection Act in 1982, the 
Committee on the Judiciary reported to the Senate the justification 
for requiring restitution from defendants: 
The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every 
formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It 
holds that, whatever else the sanctioning power of society does to 
punish its wrongdoers, it should also ensure that the wrongdoer is 
 
 190.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2327(b)(3) (2012)). 
 191.  Id.; see Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t. 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (“We do 
not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it 
nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown 
elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.”). 
 192.  Brief for United States Senators, supra note 109, at 10. 
 193.  Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1727–29 (2014). 
 194.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012). 
07.LAWRENCE.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/4/2016  6:11 PM 
325 The Peril of Paroline 
 355 
required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or her 
prior state of well-being.195 
This comports with common principles of restitution found in 
tort law. Although the Mandatory Restitution Act is part of a 
criminal statute, its function is similar to a tort claim in its effect—
making the victim whole from the losses caused by the defendant.196 
As such, the court “on appellate review in Monzel . . . concluded that 
‘tort doctrine [would] inform[ its] thinking’” in matters of 
restitution.197 The Supreme Court recognizes that restitution serves 
purposes that, although different in some respects from the purposes 
of tort law, also overlap in some respects.198 
Harper et al. note that “[t]he primary notion [for awarding 
restitution] is that of repairing [the] injury or of making [the victim] 
whole as nearly as that may be done by an award of money.”199 
Harper et al. also describe compensation as “a natural enough 
corollary of the fault principle . . . . [I]t seems eminently fair that 
these damages should (at least) put the plaintiff as nearly as may be 
in the same position he would have been in if defendant’s wrong had 
caused no injury.”200 The primary goal of the courts should be to 
make the victims whole to the extent possible, which requires full 
restitution in a timely manner so that the victims can get the care 
and services they need. 
 
 195.  S. REP. No. 104-179, at 12–13 (1995) (quoting Judiciary Comm., S. REP. No. 97-
532, at 30 (1982)). 
 196.  Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 92–93. 
 197.  Id. (quoting United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).  
Although § 2259 is a criminal statute, it functions much like a tort statute by 
directing the court to make a victim whole for losses caused by the responsible 
party. “Functionally, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a tort statute, though 
one that casts back to a much earlier era of Anglo-American law, when criminal and 
tort proceedings were not clearly distinguished.”  
Monzel, 641 F.3d at 535 n.5 (quoting United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 
1999)) (citation omitted). 
 198.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1724 (“Aside from the manifest procedural differences 
between criminal sentencing and civil tort lawsuits, restitution serves purposes that differ from 
(though they overlap with) the purposes of tort law.”). 
 199.  4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1 (2d ed. 1986). 
 200.  Id. 
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In apparent disregard of the extensive professional research 
available to Congress, the Court determined that “Paroline’s 
contribution to the causal process underlying the victim’s losses [as a 
single possessor] was very minor.”201 This notion ignores the way the 
demand for child pornography creates the supply,202 and, more 
importantly, the real harm to the victim caused by even one 
defendant’s possession—a harm that cannot be extricated from the 
aggregate harm of potentially tens of thousands of possessors.203 
Although the Court acknowledged that “the victim suffers 
continuing and grievous harm as a result of her knowledge that a 
large, indeterminate number of individuals have viewed and will in 
the future view images of the sexual abuse she endured,” and that 
“[t]he unlawful conduct of everyone who reproduces, distributes, or 
possesses the images of the victim’s abuse—including Paroline—
plays a part in sustaining and aggravating this tragedy,” the Court 
refused to hold the defendant liable for the full amount of damages 
fearing that it might inconvenience the guilty defendant when he 
faces difficulty trying to seek the right to contribution from other 
defendants,204 which the Court seemed to find to be a more serious 
infraction than inconveniencing the innocent victim.205 
This does not comport with the principles of tort law that 
overlap with the restitution orders of criminal sentencing. 
“[W]hoever does an injury to another is liable in damages to the 
extent of that injury.”206 It was Congress’s aim, clearly stated, to 
 
 201.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725. 
 202.  See supra text accompanying notes 46–49. 
 203.  See supra text accompanying notes 71–73. 
 204.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725–26. 
 205.  Id. at 1729 (“Congress has not promised victims full and swift resolution.”). But 
Congress did state in the declaration in the Crime Victim’s Rights that a crime victim has 
“[t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (2012). 
The Court apparently finds it acceptable to “consign [victims] to ‘piecemeal’ restitution and 
leave [them] to face ‘decades of litigation that might never lead to full recovery.’” Paroline, 
134 S. Ct. at 1729 (quoting Brief for Respondent Amy at 57, Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 
12-8561), 2013 WL 6056611). “Of course the victim should someday collect restitution for 
all her child-pornography losses, but it makes sense to spread payment among a larger number 
of offenders . . . .” Id. 
 206.  4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 199 (citations omitted). 
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award the victim the full amount of her losses.207 Victims will not be 
receiving a windfall—they are only able to recover for actual expenses 
related to and caused by the offense under § 2259 in a criminal 
sentencing hearing. Moreover, when a person “intentionally or 
recklessly causes harm,” that actor “is subject to liability for a 
broader range of harms than the harms for which that actor would 
be liable if only acting negligently.”208 Those who possess child 
pornography are intentional tortfeasors, a realm where proximate 
cause is rarely a factor.209 
Furthermore, the majority ignores the fact that the defendant is 
acting in concert with the producers, distributors, and other 
possessors, despite the fact that he may have had “no contact with 
the overwhelming majority” and that they are “geographically and 
temporally distant.”210 Although “[o]ur present system . . . has 
traditionally focused attention on the defendant’s individual fault, 
and the limitations on defendant’s liability bear the mark of the fault 
formula,”211 there are well-established tort principles that an 
intentional wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable with other 
wrongdoers for an innocent victim’s losses.212 Where there is an 
innocent victim who suffers an indivisible harm (a harm that can’t be 
determined who is responsible for what part of the harm among the 
 
 207.  18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2012). 
 208.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 33 (AM. LAW INST. 2005). 
 209.  Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199, 
1206 (2013).  
In intentional tort cases “the defendant’s wrongful conduct is closely linked—
temporally and conceptually—to the plaintiff’s harm.” Few intentional tort cases 
involve multiple causal factors. Further, the intent requirement makes it clearer that 
the defendant should be held accountable for its actions, and courts express less 
concern about extending liability in this context. Thus, the necessity and strength of 
proximate cause doctrine severely diminishes in the intentional tort context. When 
proximate cause is relevant in intentional tort cases, proximate cause analysis may 
cut off liability for the defendant in fewer circumstances than it would when applied 
to negligence. 
Id. at 1206–07 (quoting Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities 
Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 832 (2009)) (citations omitted). 
 210.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1725. 
 211. HARPER ET AL., supra note 199, at 130–31. 
 212.  Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 89. 
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defendants),213 and all defendants are guilty (particularly when they 
are intentional tortfeasors),214 the defendants should bear the 
responsibility for the entire burden and that part of the burden that 
the co-offenders cannot or will not cover.215 
Justice Sotomayor acknowledges in her dissent that individual 
offenders act in concert as part of a larger network with knowledge 
of their roles and the larger harm their actions cause to the victim.216 
Therefore, a causal link is established in an indivisible harm and they 
should be held liable in full.217 Justice Roberts also notes that there is 
no way to prove what exact part of the harm was caused by the 
defendant’s actions; therefore, any amount of damages must be 
arbitrarily decided and the injury to the victim is not divisible.218 
These opinions, though not sustained by the majority, are more in 
line with common law principles and help to fulfill Congress’s 
purpose to award the victim the full amount of her losses. As 
Sotomayor opines in her dissent, the statute requires full restitution 
to the victim.219 
In a lower court decision, Monzel, the court declined to hold 
Monzel jointly and severally liable for all of Amy’s losses in its 
restitution order, citing “substantial logistical difficulties in tracking 
awards made and money actually recovered.”220 Although this 
 
 213.  See id. at 96–101. 
 214.  “[E]ach person who commits a tort that requires intent is jointly and severally liable 
for any indivisible injury legally caused by the tortious conduct.” Id. at 102 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 12 (2000)). “[T]here is, so 
far as we are aware, no authority whatsoever for exempting intentional tortfeasors from joint 
and several liability.” Id. 
 215.  See id. at 96–109. 
 216.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1741 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, one 
expert describes Internet child pornography networks as ‘an example of a complex criminal 
conspiracy,’—the quintessential concerted action to which joint and several liability attaches.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 217.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 218.  Id. at 1732–33 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 219.  Id. at 1739–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 220.  United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting United 
States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 832 (W.D. Va. 2010)). 
Using what it described as ‘traditional principles’ of tort law, the court rejected 
Amy’s argument that Monzel should be held jointly and severally liable for all of her 
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difficulty will occur and need to be dealt with appropriately, the 
difficulty should not be a burden the victim has to bear. It should 
more justly fall on the defendants and the government. 
“[T]raditional tort law principles strongly support the conclusion 
that § 2259 should be read to impose liability on each child 
pornography defendant and that each defendant should be liable for 
the full amount of their victim’s losses,” because “child pornography 
victims suffer indivisible losses that intentional tortfeasors (i.e., 
criminals) must jointly and severally pay in their entirety.”221 
C. The Paroline Decision: An Example of Judicial Overreach and 
Judicial Activism 
Ultimately, what branch of government should make particular 
decisions relies on several important factors that should be balanced 
in determining the comparative institutional competence to reach 
particular decisions.222 
[The] indicia of comparative competencies include the relevant 
grants of constitutional power over the issues; the ability of the 
judiciary to develop consistent, workable standards to govern the 
determination; the role of political accountability in determining 
the appropriate respect due to competing sovereigns; the ability to 
tailor solutions and respond flexibly to changing circumstances; the 
 
losses because Monzel was essentially a joint tortfeasor with other criminals who had 
caused her indivisible injuries. Because Monzel’s possession of a “single image” was 
not independently sufficient to cause the entirety of Amy’s injury, the court 
reasoned that it could not therefore be viewed as creating an ‘indivisible’ injury. 
Likewise, because Amy suffered separate injuries each time someone viewed her 
images, the defendant was obligated to pay restitution only for the separate injury 
for which he was individually responsible. 
Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 92–93. “Monzel’s possession of a single image of Amy was 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of all of her losses. She would have suffered 
tremendously from her sexual abuse regardless of what Monzel did.” Monzel, 641 F.3d at 538. 
 221.  Cassell et al., supra note 17, at 90. 
 222.  Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency and Sovereignty in Indian 
Affairs, 85 U. COLO. L. R. 759, 781 (2014). “This question of institutional competence is 
very much related to traditional ‘separation of powers’ philosophy. As a feature of our 
government, various institutions have been structured in different ways (with overlapping 
powers) to achieve different goals.” Jason Mehta, The Development of Federal Professional 
Responsibility Rules: The Effect of Institutional Choice on Rule Outcomes, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 57, 72 (2007). 
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control over resource allocation questions that may factor into 
policy determinations; and the subject matter expertise of the 
branch involved.223 
Where problems are “polycentric,” or have “complex 
repercussions” such that “adjudication cannot encompass and take 
[them] into account,” these should not be within the policy-making 
decisions of the judicial branch.224 
The principle of institutional competency is illustrated in a 
landmark Supreme Court decision in 1982. In New York v. Ferber, 
the Court held that child pornography was out of the reach of First 
Amendment protections on free speech and that New York had 
appropriately acted to protect the interests of children in prohibiting 
the knowing promotion or distribution of sexual performances by 
children under 16.225 In reaching this decision, the Court 
appropriately relied on reports from committee hearings in both the 
House and the Senate, found that child pornography had “become a 
serious national problem,”226 and deferred to the legislative branches’ 
policy-making authority in this area. 
This deference to Congress’s findings appropriately allocated the 
fact-finding and policymaking aspects of legislation to the legislative 
branch, allowing both the state legislatures and the United States 
Congress to utilize their role as the legislative authority with the 
accompanying political accountability to make laws that reflected the 
political will of the people through their representatives. In contrast, 
however, twenty-two years later in its Paroline decision, the Court 
ignored the explicitly stated purposes and intentions of Congress, 
including the plain language of the statute, and took on a policy-
making role that should belong strictly in the hands of the political 
branch. The Court went beyond its role of interpreter to judicial 
activism, ignoring the careful deliberations of Congress when it 
 
 223.  Steele, supra note 222 at 781. 
 224.  Id. at 783 n.116 (quoting Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–95 (1978)). 
 225.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 226.  Id. at 749. “[C]hild pornography and child prostitution have become highly 
organized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a nationwide scale.” Id. at 749 n.1 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 95-348, p. 5 (1977)). 
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enacted the Mandatory Restitution provision. The majority thought 
it had a better way to “impress upon defendants that their acts are 
not irrelevant or victimless.”227 The majority, therefore, rejected the 
statute as written, took a stretched interpretation that would fit their 
purposes and policies, and effectively rewrote § 2259 to comport 
with their ill-informed notions. 
Having been left with the Paroline decision, which flatly 
contradicts the stated intent of § 2259, Congress’s primary 
recourse is to pass new legislation in order to correct the Court and 
clarify its intentions, a time consuming and difficult process. In a 
2014 proposed legislation that had bipartisan support in both 
chambers, Congress essentially tells the Court that they got it 
wrong in Paroline. The proposed Amy and Vicky Child 
Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2014, has 90 
co-sponsors (59 Democrats and 31 Republicans) in the House,228 
and 23 supporters (11 Democrats and 12 Republicans) in the 
Senate at the time of writing.229 
The amendment acknowledges that “[t]he unlawful collective 
conduct of every individual who reproduces, distributes, or possesses 
the images of a victim’s childhood sexual abuse plays a part in 
sustaining and aggravating the harms to that individual victim,” 
constituting “intentional crimes that combine to produce an 
indivisible injury to a victim.”230 As such, the amendment seeks to 
adopt an aggregate causation standard, holding each defendant 
jointly and severally liable with the ability to recover contributions. 
The proposed amendment also addresses the “proximate result” 
issue, clarifying that “in addition to the costs listed in subparagraph 
(A),” such as medical expenses, lost income, therapy, transportation, 
attorney’s fees, etc., “the term ‘full amount of the victim’s losses’ 
 
 227.  Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1715 (2014). 
 228.  Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2014, 
H.R. 4981, 113th Cong. (2014), reintroduced as Amy and Vicky Child Pornography Victim 
Restitution Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 595, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter Amy and 
Vicky Act]. The Amy and Vicky Act was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, terrorism, 
Homeland Security, and Investigations on Mar. 17, 2015. 2015 FED CRS SUM H.R. 595 
(Westlaw), 114th Cong. (2015). 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Id. at § 2(4). 
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also includes any other losses suffered by the victim . . . if those 
losses are a proximate result of the offense.”231 Thus, the proposed 
legislation states in a manner beyond dispute that the proximate-
result limitation only applies to the catchall “other losses” provision 
(as it had previously informed the Court in its amicus curiae brief).232 
D. Effects of the Paroline Decision 
The Paroline decision has done little to help courts clarify the 
amount of restitution that victims should be awarded. In cases being 
decided post-Paroline, some courts have used “the Hernandez 
approach,” which divides the total amount of the victim’s losses by 
the number of standing restitution orders.233 Other courts have used 
the Gamble formulation for calculating restitution awards by dividing 
the losses by the number of defendants convicted of the offense.234 
The District Court for the District of Rhode Island estimated a pool 
of defendants at 1000 (approximately double the current number), 
and accordingly awarded the victim 1/1000th (0.1%) of the 
outstanding losses.235 Another court, noting that Paroline is of 
limited use in its suggested “starting point” for losses caused by 
“continuing trafficking,” determined that the court would, instead, 
consider the other factors discussed in Paroline.236 
Although the district courts appear to be using the guidelines 
given in Paroline to implement appropriate restitution under § 2259, 
the resulting awards vary considerably in the amount and the 
method of calculation. Furthermore, some victims are not given any 
 
 231.  Id. at § 3(1)(B). 
 232.  See supra text accompanying notes 118–119. 
 233.  See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, No. 2:11-CR00026GEB, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 89688 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2014) (awarding victim $2,282.86 in restitution); United 
States v. Watkins, No. 2:13-CR00268LKKAC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112420 (E.D. Cal. 
Aug. 12, 2014) (awarding victim $2,191.74 in restitution). 
 234.  See United States v. Gamble, 709 F.3d 541, 554 (6th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., United 
States v. Galan, No. 6:11-CR60148AA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94377 (D. Or. July 11, 2014) 
(awarding victim $3,433.00). 
 235.  United States v. Crisostomi, No. 12-166M, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97513 (D. R.I. 
July 16, 2014) (awarding one victim $713.68 and another victim $683.41). 
 236.  United States v. Reynolds, No. 12-20843, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116854, at *15 
(D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2014) (awarding one victim $11,000 and another $15,500). 
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restitution if the court determines that the defendant did not 
“knowingly receive[] an image” of the specified victim.237 Victims are 
required to submit restitution requests in each of the cases in which 
they are identified as a victim. They bear the burden of justifying the 
amount of their losses and recovering the amount they are awarded 
from each defendant. This can be particularly onerous and harmful 
as each new case is a reminder that their images are still in 
circulation. One judge noted that “[t]hough the court has awarded 
restitution, the negligible amount and piecemeal process under § 
2259 can hardly be considered a victory for Cindy and other victims 
like her.”238 He further stated that the restitution award “does not 
fully compensate losses suffered by child pornography victims and 
may, in fact, dissuade victims from seeking restitution; the end result 
is hardly worth yet another reminder of their continued 
exploitation.”239 The burden on the victim as the situation currently 
stands is more than the victim should have to bear. 
In the Paroline decision, the Court wants to avoid a situation 
where “each possessor of the victim’s images would bear the 
consequences of the acts of the many thousands who possessed those 
images.”240 Instead, the Court shifts this burden from the guilty 
defendant to the innocent victim. However, this burden should 
rightfully rest on those who wronged the victim by knowingly 
appropriating his or her image—the defendants should be the one to 
try to recover contributions from other defendants. 
In Salt Lake City, the Utah Crime Victims Legal Clinic works 
with district courts nationwide to try to secure some restitution for 
Andy241 on a pro bono basis.242 The Court’s decision in Paroline 
creates an enormous workload for the clinic, which receives several 
notices for each of the hundreds of defendants being prosecuted 
 
 237.  Hernandez, No. 2:11-CR00026GEB at *16. 
 238.  United States v. Galan, No. 6:11-CR60148AA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94377, at 
*21–22 (D. Or. July 11, 2014). 
 239.  Id. at 22. 
 240.  Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2014). 
 241.  See supra Part I. 
 242.  This information is based on the author’s experience working as an intern on these 
cases in the summer of 2014. 
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across the nation. The clinic must track each case and send in a 
restitution request for each sentencing. Sometimes, the logistical 
implications of the timing of the sentencing hearings makes it 
difficult to get requests in before the judicially set deadlines. 
Attorneys and interns have devoted thousands of hours to this task, 
and are seeing limited success. Should Andy have to pay an attorney 
for this legal service, the costs would be enormous and prohibitive. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress’s intent in the Mandatory Restitution Act was and is 
plain. Victims of child pornography should be awarded the full 
amount of their losses in restitution. Defendants should be held 
jointly and severally liable, with the ability to seek compensation 
from new defendants as the cases arise. Congress made its 
intentions known in its amicus brief presented in the Paroline case, 
which the Court largely disregarded. The Court also abandoned 
several important canons of construction, leaving Congress less 
capable of drafting legislation in a manner that they can predict will 
be upheld by the courts. As a result of the Paroline decision, 
Congress is working on new legislation that would, in effect, 
overturn Paroline. The courts should interpret the “Paroline-fix” in 
a way that effects the intentions of Congress and provides much 
needed restitution to victims. 
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